“Each promise of marriage would not be considered as a fact of misconception for the purpose of consensual sexual intercourse unless it is established that such promise of marriage was a false promise of marriage on the part of the accused since the beginning of such a relationship.”
Allahabad High Court
In an application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking to quash the chargesheet and the entire criminal proceedings under Sections 376 (Rape) and 386 of the Penal Code, 1860, Justice Anish Kumar Gupta, while dismissing the criminal case against the accused, noted that the complainant, a mature woman with adult sons, had initiated a physical relationship with the accused while her husband was still alive.
This raises important questions about her legal capacity to enter into a new commitment. Given her marital status, any promise of marriage made by the accused would lack legal validity, as she was not legally able to marry at that time. Moreover, her participation in the relationship seems to have been motivated by personal desire, making it difficult for her to claim victimhood due to a breach of promise, as such a promise was legally non-existent at the start of their relationship.
Background
On 21-03-2018, the informant filed an FIR under Sections 376 and 386 of the Penal Code, 1860 at the Women’s Police Station. She alleged that her husband had been suffering from diabetes for the past 15 years, which severely limited his mobility, and despite various treatments, his condition did not improve. During this time, her husband introduced the accused, describing him as a trustworthy person who would take care of her after his death.
Over time, the accused became close to the informant and allegedly told her that her husband had only a few days left to live, after which they would marry. Gaining her trust with promises of marriage, the accused initiated a physical relationship with her. After the death of her husband on 29-05-2017, the accused continued visiting and maintaining a physical relationship with the informant.
When the informant asked him to marry her, the accused delayed, saying that he would marry her after his sister’s marriage. Later, the informant discovered that the accused had become engaged to another woman on 31-12-2017.
The informant further alleged that the accused continued to have sexual relations with her under the pretext of marriage and secretly recorded a video of her. He then demanded Rs. 50,00,000/- within 15 days, threatening to kill her sons and make the video public if his demands were not met.
Analysis and Decision
The Court observed that during the investigation, Call Detail Records (CDR) were obtained, and based on these, the Investigating Officer concluded that the alleged location of the incident in the FIR did not match the CDR reports of both the accused and the informant. It was also noted that the informant is a 50-year-old woman with two adult sons, aged 27 and 25, while the accused is about 26 years old. After the death of the informant’s husband, her son took over the family business and was responsible for paying Rs. 1,00,00,000/- to the accused.
The Court also referred to Sections 375 and 90 of the IPC, stating that for an offence under Section 375, consent requires the voluntary participation of the prosecutrix in the physical relationship. Consent in such cases would only be invalid if it was given under a misconception of fact or through fear of harm to the victim or someone in whom the victim has an interest.
The Court further noted that, at the time the informant initiated the physical relationship with the accused, her husband was still alive. Therefore, any allegation that the accused had promised to marry her was irrelevant, as the informant herself was not legally capable of marrying the accused at that time. Moreover, their consensual physical relationship continued for about 12-13 years without any objections from the informant. The Court concluded that this long-term consensual adulterous relationship did not qualify as rape under the definition outlined in Section 375 of the IPC.
The Court, after referring to various judgments, clarified its interpretation of a promise to marry. It stated that not every promise of marriage can be considered a ground for claiming a misconception of fact in cases of consensual sexual intercourse. For such a promise to be deemed false, it must be proven that the accused had no intention of fulfilling the promise from the start of the relationship. Unless it is alleged that the accused engaged in deceit from the outset, the promise cannot be considered false. A promise made in good faith that later falls apart due to changing circumstances or other issues between the parties cannot be treated as a misconception of consent for engaging in a physical relationship.
The Court further stated that when a woman of mature age, fully aware of the implications of engaging in a physical relationship based on a promise of marriage, willingly participates, she understands the risks involved, and there is a clear distinction between a marriage and a promise of marriage.
The Court emphasized that if the parties had a long-standing, consensual physical relationship without any deception from the outset, such a relationship would not be considered rape.
The Court concluded that the allegation of a promise to marry, contingent on the death of the informant’s husband, was merely an excuse made by her. Even if the accused had made such a promise, it held no legal weight, as the informant, a mature woman with two adult children, had knowingly and willingly entered into the relationship.
The Court also noted that it appeared the informant had enticed the accused, who was financially dependent on her family, into the relationship. This dependency led to the informant coercing him into the affair, which was initiated with her clear and voluntary consent. As a result, the relationship did not constitute rape under Section 375 of the IPC.
The Court held that no offence of rape was established against the accused in this case. It found that the informant had filed the FIR out of frustration after learning about the accused’s engagement to another woman and was unwilling to let him go. As a result, the allegation of forcible rape was fabricated by the informant solely to justify filing the FIR, and this claim was not supported by the investigation.
Consequently, the Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused.