“A plain reading of Section 17 DV Act confers upon every woman in a domestic relationship the right to reside in the shared household, irrespective of whether she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same. However, it does not create a proprietary interest in the property and is subject to lawful eviction in accordance with due process.”…
Delhi High Court: An appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 was filed challenging the Family Court’s order dated 22-3-2024 (“impugned order”). The Family Court had decreed possession, damages, use and occupation charges, and injunctions in favour of the respondent. It held that the appellant’s claim over the property was only that of a gratuitous licensee, whose right of residence had been revoked through notices. Referring to the divorce decree, the Family Court further observed that the appellant had no enforceable right to continue residing in the premises and granted six months’ time to vacate.
A Division Bench comprising Anil Kshetarpal* and Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar JJ. noted that once a valid divorce decree dissolves the marriage, the domestic relationship comes to an end. Consequently, the foundation for claiming a right of residence under Section 17 of the Domestic Violence Act no longer survives, unless some other statutory right is established. Finding no error in the Family Court’s decision, the High Court dismissed the appeal.
Background:
The present appeal stemmed from a family dispute relating to matrimonial and property rights. The appellant, daughter-in-law of the original plaintiff (now deceased), had married the respondent’s son on 13-4-1999 in accordance with Hindu rites, and the couple had a son on 7-2-2000. The dispute centered on property located at D-2/217, Sector-11, Rohini, Delhi (“suit property”), which the appellant asserted was her matrimonial home since marriage.
She contended that the property was originally purchased in her husband’s name but was subsequently transferred to the respondent under pressure arising from strained relations. The appellant further claimed that she, along with her family, had contributed financially to the construction of the property. In support, her brother testified to having contributed ₹60,000 in 1998. Additionally, the appellant alleged cruelty and harassment at the hands of her husband and in-laws, asserting that ancestral contributions had also gone into the property’s construction.
The appellant further contended that false allegations were made against her regarding an unidentified person residing with her, which prompted her husband to initiate divorce proceedings.
In response, she filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”), which was dismissed on grounds of maintainability without adjudication on merits. During the pendency of the civil suit, the respondent passed away and was substituted by his legal heir (daughter). A divorce decree was granted on 19-11-2019 and upheld in appeal solely on the ground of limitation, but was later set aside by the Supreme Court and remanded for fresh consideration, now listed for 9-10-2025.
Notices revoking the appellant’s permission to reside in the property were issued on 23-7-2013 and 20-12-2013. However, she failed to vacate and allegedly attempted to sell or create third-party rights in the suit property. Consequently, the respondent instituted a suit seeking possession, damages for unauthorized use and occupation, and an injunction restraining the appellant from alienating or encumbering the property.
In its impugned order dated 22-3-2024, the Family Court held that the respondent had established ownership through the 2011 Conveyance Deed, while the appellant had failed to prove any financial contribution. Even assuming such contribution, the Court observed, it could not override the respondent’s title as absolute owner. The Court further held that the appellant’s status was only that of a gratuitous licensee, whose right of residence had been revoked by the notices. Considering the divorce decree, it concluded that she had no enforceable right to remain in the premises, granting her six months’ time to vacate.
Accordingly, a decree of possession and permanent injunction was passed in the respondent’s favour, though the claim for damages was denied for want of evidence. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred the present appeal before the Court.
Analysis and Decision:
The Court noted that Section 17 of the Domestic Violence Act grants every woman in a domestic relationship the right to reside in the shared household, regardless of ownership or title. However, this right is not absolute, as it does not create any proprietary interest and remains subject to lawful eviction through due process. The Court emphasized that the protection under Section 17 is premised on the existence of a “domestic relationship.” Once a valid divorce dissolves the marriage, the domestic relationship ceases, and with it the basis for claiming a right of residence under the provision, unless another statutory right exists.
In the present case, the appellant’s marriage had been dissolved by a decree of divorce dated 19-11-2019. Although that decree was challenged and the matter remanded for fresh adjudication, there was presently no subsisting matrimonial bond or domestic relationship between the parties. In the absence of such a relationship, the essential requirement for invoking Section 17 of the DV Act was not met. Accordingly, the Court held that the appellant’s claim of a continuing right of residence under the Act stood substantially weakened, pending the outcome of her appeal.
The Court then turned to the issue of ownership and possession of the suit property. It noted that the respondents relied on a will dated 20-7-2013, allegedly executed by the deceased respondent in favour of her daughter, while the appellant challenged its authenticity, alleging it was forged and fabricated.
The Court observed, however, that the will had been produced and proved through PW-3, one of the attesting witnesses. Although, during cross-examination, he failed to recall the name of the second attesting witness and was confronted with suggestions of monetary inducement, these shortcomings were insufficient to undermine the substance of his testimony or the legality of the execution. As the document bore the necessary signatures and complied with the statutory requirements under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court held that the will stood duly proved and the respondents’ title derived from it could not be disputed.
The Court, relying on the Relinquishment Deed dated 1-11-2016 allegedly executed by the appellant’s husband in favour of his sister, held that the appellant had not substantiated her allegation that the deed was a collusive arrangement intended to defeat her residence claim. It further observed that the Family Court had rightly relied upon the registered Conveyance Deed dated 7-6-2011, which independently confirmed that title to the suit property vested in the deceased respondent and thereafter devolved in accordance with the will.
The Court also noted that the appellant’s contention regarding PW-1’s inability to recall specific details of the property’s original acquisition did not diminish the evidentiary value of the registered documents. The burden, it held, rested on the appellant to establish her plea of contribution or duress, which she had failed to discharge.
While examining the appellant’s plea that the suit property was ancestral or that her family had contributed to its acquisition, the Court found the evidence insufficient to establish any legal or equitable interest in her favour. The claim that her brother advanced ₹60,000 in 1998 was unsupported by documentary proof, and oral testimony alone could not outweigh the registered title documents produced by the respondents. The Court held that such assertions of contribution did not create any enforceable proprietary right.
On the issue of eviction, the Court noted that notices revoking the appellant’s permissive occupation had been issued in 2013, followed by the filing of the possession suit. The Family Court, after a detailed evaluation of the pleadings and evidence, decreed possession and granted the appellant six months to vacate. Holding that the process was neither arbitrary nor inequitable, the Court found no infirmity in the Family Court’s order and accordingly dismissed the appeal along with pending applications.