A major relief for Mr. Khatri—the Rajasthan High Court has held that his adult son cannot reside in his home without his consent. The ruling reaffirms Mr. Khatri’s exclusive ownership and his authority over who may occupy the property, marking a clear affirmation of the father’s property rights.
On October 28, 2025, the Rajasthan High Court held that an adult, married son cannot remain in his father’s property without his permission.
The Court referred to the matter as an unfortunate dispute over immovable property between a father and his son that had dragged on for five years, noting it as a reflection of declining ethical and moral values in society. In the proceedings, the son appeared as the appellant-defendant, while the father was the respondent-plaintiff.
The property at the centre of the case—a 90×112 sq. ft. plot in Sawai Madhopur District, Rajasthan—was said to have been jointly purchased by Mr. Khatri and his brother, Radheshyam, in a Nagar Palika auction held on August 21, 1974. The sale deed was later registered in both their names before the Sub-Registrar, Sawai Madhopur, on September 19, 2003.
Mr. Khatri informed the Court that the plot had been mutually divided between him and his brother, and that the western portion measuring 45×112 sq. ft. had fallen to his share. A written document reflecting this agreed division was executed on August 25, 2003. He further stated that he constructed a residential house on his allotted portion and that he is its sole owner and exclusive possessor.
He added that after his son’s marriage, he allowed his son and daughter-in-law to occupy two bedrooms, two storerooms, a kitchen, and a bathroom located in the southern part of the house for their accommodation. Mr. Khatri therefore contended that his son is living in that part of the property only with his permission and in the capacity of a licensee.
However, Mr. Khatri stated that his son had been behaving in a troublesome manner, causing him continuous mental distress. Owing to this conduct, he asked his son—who was living in that part of the house with his wife—to vacate the premises. The son, however, ignored the request and continued to mistreat Mr. Khatri.
Consequently, on November 26, 2018, Mr. Khatri served a legal notice on his son by Registered Post, formally revoking the permission and licence previously granted to him. He also demanded that his son vacate the portion of the house and return possession to him.
Mr. Khatri further claimed ₹15,000 per month from his son as mesne profits for the use and occupation of that portion of the house until its possession is restored to him.
In reply to the legal notice, the son’s counsel denied the allegations, calling the incident false and misrepresented. The son claimed that he occupied the house as an owner, not as a licensee.
As a result, Mr. Khatri filed a Civil Suit on January 16, 2019, seeking a mandatory injunction directing his son to vacate the premises and return actual possession of the portion he occupied. He also sought mesne profits of ₹15,000 per month from the date of filing the suit, along with a permanent injunction against his son.
Rather than respecting his father’s wishes, the son contested the matter in court, submitting a written statement on May 14, 2019.
In his written statement, the son attempted to counter Mr. Khatri’s claims by asserting that Plot No. 1 had been purchased at auction by his father and uncle using income from their HUF firm, M/s Panna Lal Prem Raj Khatri. He further contended that the plot had originally been acquired by his grandfather, Shri Bal Mukand Ji Khatri, who had constructed two residential units on it for his sons—plaintiff Shyam Sundar and his brother Radheshyam.
The son firmly maintained that the property formed part of the HUF and that he, as a coparcener, held a share in it.
The son further stated in his written statement that after his marriage in 2004, the portion of the property measuring 45×112 feet—allegedly allotted to his father—was orally divided. According to him, the southern part of the house measuring 55×45 sq. ft. was given to him, while the northern portion went to his younger brother.
He asserted that since then, he has been the rightful owner of his portion of the property and has been residing there in that capacity.
He expressly denied being a licensee of Mr. Khatri or living in the house with his father’s permission. On this basis, he also filed a counter-claim seeking a permanent injunction to prevent his father from obstructing his plan to construct a first floor on what he claimed as his portion of the property.
Mr. Khatri filed a rejoinder, stating among other things that the firm Panna Lal Prem Raj Khatri was a partnership firm and not an HUF entity, and therefore the house could not be treated as HUF property. He asserted that he alone owned and possessed the house, and that his son had no right, title, or interest in it.
He categorically denied any oral partition of the constructed property between his two sons. Mr. Khatri also firmly refuted his son’s counter-claim portraying himself as a coparcener or owner of the property and asked the Court to dismiss the counter-claim in its entirety.
Mr. Khatri firmly denied that any oral partition of the constructed property had ever taken place between his two sons. He outright rejected his son’s counter-claim asserting coparcenary rights or ownership over the disputed house and urged the Court to dismiss the claim.
On October 28, 2025, the Rajasthan High Court ruled in Mr. Khatri’s favour. Speaking to ET Wealth Online, Sachin Bhandawat, Partner at Khaitan & Co, noted:
“The Rajasthan High Court has reaffirmed a well-established principle of Indian succession law: adult children have no inherent right to reside in or claim their parents’ self-acquired property. Such property, purchased from a parent’s personal income, remains solely under their control during their lifetime. A child can live there only with the parent’s consent, not as a matter of legal right.”
Bhandawat explained that if a property belongs to a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) or is ancestral in nature, all coparceners share a community of interest and joint possession. Every coparcener gains rights in such property by birth, including the right to use and enjoy it. If any coparcener is prevented from exercising these rights, it amounts to ouster, and a court can issue an injunction to protect their interest.
He added that the judgment clearly distinguishes between self-acquired and ancestral property—safeguarding an individual’s exclusive ownership while also recognising the shared rights that exist in HUF property. In this case, the son was unable to prove that the property was jointly owned or jointly enjoyed. Hence, identifying the true nature of a property becomes central to determining the validity of legal claims and residence rights.
Rajasthan High Court examined the property dispute between the father and son
In its judgment ([2025:RJ-JP:42107]) dated October 31, 2025, the Rajasthan High Court noted that, while admitting the second appeal, it had framed the following substantial questions of law for consideration:
- Whether, in the absence of a finding establishing a licensor–licensee relationship between the plaintiff (Mr. Khatri, the father) and the defendant (the son), the trial court could validly pass a decree of eviction in a suit seeking a mandatory injunction?
- Whether the appellate court was justified in disregarding and overturning the trial court’s finding on the non-existence of a licensee relationship, yet still upholding the trial court’s decree?
- Whether the trial court and the appellate court misread or misconstrued the evidence on record while issuing a decree in favour of the plaintiff (Mr. Khatri, the father) and subsequently affirming it on appeal?
- Whether a decree can still be granted in favour of the plaintiff (Mr. Khatri) despite the alleged non-establishment of material facts and lack of proof of the plaint’s assertions?
Substantial Questions of Law No. (I) & (II):-
The Rajasthan High Court observed that both questions of law centered on whether a licensor–licensee relationship existed between Mr. Khatri and his son.
It noted that the trial court and the first appellate court had concurrently found that the defendant, as the plaintiff’s son, was residing in the disputed house solely with his father’s permission and not in the capacity of a licensee.
Since the plaintiff, Mr. Khatri, has withdrawn his permission, the defendant (his son) can be directed to vacate the portion of the property he occupies and return possession to his father, as the property is the father’s self-owned asset.
During the hearing, the Senior Counsel for the appellant/defendant (the son) attempted to argue that, in the plaint, Mr. Khatri had described his son as a licensee.
The son’s counsel argued that since both courts had concluded that the defendant was not a licensee of Mr. Khatri, the plaintiff’s suit should have failed.
He further submitted that the defendant, as the natural-born son of the plaintiff and someone born in the very house in dispute, could not be treated as a licensee. Therefore, without a licensor–licensee relationship, a suit seeking a mandatory injunction was not maintainable.
The Rajasthan High Court observed that although the arguments advanced by the son’s Senior Counsel may seem persuasive at first glance, a careful and holistic reading of the plaint reveals the true context. While the plaintiff, Mr. Khatri, did use the term “licensee” in Paragraphs 4, 6, and 8, the intended meaning was simply that the son had been living in his father’s house with permission. Once that permission was revoked, the son no longer had any right to continue occupying the portion of the property.
The Rajasthan High Court noted that, at this stage, it is important to emphasise that the factual findings of both lower courts—based on the assessment of oral and documentary evidence—clearly establish that the disputed property is not HUF property but the self-acquired property of the plaintiff, Mr. Khatri. These findings are not under challenge. The Court also recorded that the defendant (the son) has not appealed against the rejection of his counter-claim, a fact acknowledged by his own Senior Counsel.
Rajasthan High Court relies on Delhi High Court precedent
The Rajasthan High Court noted that the Delhi High Court, in Ramesh Kumar Handoo v. Shri Binay Kumar Basu [MANU/DE/8953/2007], had addressed a similar issue in a second appeal.
In that case, the father had filed a civil suit seeking a mandatory injunction against his married daughter and son-in-law, asking them to vacate the property and return possession. The Delhi High Court held that a married daughter stands on the same footing as a married son. It observed that since the father was the perpetual licensee of the property on which the house was built, and the daughter and her husband were living there only with his permission, they were required to vacate once that permission was withdrawn. The Court further affirmed that a suit for mandatory injunction in such circumstances is maintainable.
The Delhi High Court had based its reasoning on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew [(2005) 7 SCC 667].
The meaning of the term “license” under Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 was examined by the Supreme Court in Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha v. Manhabalal Jeram Damodar [(2013) 15 SCC 358]. In Paragraph 53 of its judgment, the Court clarified that a licence need not necessarily involve payment of a licence fee; it may also include a gratuitous licence. In other words, a licensor may allow someone to enter and occupy property without any monetary consideration.
Accordingly, the Rajasthan High Court held that, given the factual findings of the two courts below and the precedents already discussed, the proposed questions of law do not arise in this second appeal.
Substantial Questions of Law No. (III) & (IV)
The Rajasthan High Court noted that the defendant-son’s sole defence was that his occupancy of the disputed portion of the property was not as a licensee but as a co-parcener or owner. He claimed the property to be part of the HUF; however, this assertion, along with his counterclaim, remained unproven. Both courts, after evaluating the evidence from both sides, found that the defendant had not produced any document or material to show that the property belonged to an HUF or to establish his status as a co-parcener or owner. These findings, based on a proper assessment of the evidence, cannot be regarded as perverse.
Additionally, the defendant did not file any appeal challenging the dismissal of his counterclaim.
The Rajasthan High Court observed that the defendant-son had completely failed to establish any right, title, or interest in the suit property, apart from demonstrating that his possession was merely permissive. The plaintiff–Mr. Khatri (father)–had proved his absolute ownership of the property through both oral and documentary evidence.
These factual findings remain undisputed in the present second appeal, a position also acknowledged by the Senior Counsel for the appellant–defendant (son) during the course of arguments.
The Rajasthan High Court noted that the defendant’s (son’s) possession of a portion of the property, given that he is the plaintiff’s (Mr. Khatri’s) son, can be explained by the natural circumstance that a child resides in the father’s home during childhood out of love, affection, and the father’s parental responsibility.
The Court further observed: “After a child attains majority and enters into married life, the father’s decision to permit the son or daughter to continue living in his house or a part of it does not, by itself, confer any legal right over the property. Such possession cannot be treated as ownership unless the property is ancestral or forms part of a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF).”
The Rajasthan High Court noted that its view is reinforced by the Delhi High Court’s decision in Sachin & Anr. v. Jhabbulal [AIR 2017 (Delhi) 1].
In that case, elderly parents were compelled to file a civil suit seeking eviction of their two married sons from the first and second floors of their residence and to recover possession. They sought a decree of mandatory injunction directing their sons to vacate the occupied portions and to prevent them from creating any third-party interest in the property. The trial court granted the reliefs sought, and the sons’ first appeal was subsequently dismissed.
The Rajasthan High Court observed that, moreover, its authority to interfere with concurrent factual findings of the two courts below is extremely narrow and is restricted only to situations involving a substantial question of law under Section 100 of the CPC.
The Supreme Court, through a consistent line of judgments, has clearly established that the High Court is not expected to re-evaluate the entire evidentiary record or substitute its own conclusions.
Where the findings of the lower courts are grounded in a proper appreciation of evidence, the High Court cannot overturn those factual determinations.
The Rajasthan High Court stated that, for the reasons discussed and in light of the precedents cited, it is of the considered view that neither of the proposed questions of law arises in this second appeal.
Rajasthan High Court judgement
The Rajasthan High Court noted that, apart from advancing the substantial questions of law—which have already been dealt with and decided against the appellant-defendant (son)—the Senior Counsel for the appellant also contended that because the defendant was admittedly in possession of the suit property, the plaintiff (Mr. Khatri, father) should have instituted a suit for possession rather than a suit for mandatory injunction to recover possession from his son.
The Court further observed that the defendant’s (son’s) claim seeking protection of his possession is unsupported by any legally vested right. His occupation of his father’s property since childhood stems merely from familial love and affection, not from any enforceable entitlement.
The Rajasthan High Court observed: “Once a father becomes displeased with his son’s conduct and no longer wishes for him or his family to remain in his house, the son’s possession cannot be afforded legal protection merely by virtue of the relationship.”
The Court further held that the defendant (son), being the natural child of the plaintiff (Mr. Khatri) and occupying the property only with his father’s permission as a family member and gratuitous licensee, cannot insist that the plaintiff was required to file a suit for possession alone.
It has already been established that the defendant’s (son’s) occupation of the disputed portion of his father’s property was entirely gratuitous and based solely on the father’s permission, and the defendant failed to demonstrate any independent legal right over the premises.
The Rajasthan High Court stated: “The permission extended by the father has been revoked, as concurrently found by both courts below. In this factual context, and given the father–son relationship between the parties, a suit for mandatory injunction is maintainable and has been correctly decreed.”
The Court further noted that the defendant (son) had not raised this objection before either the trial court or the first appellate court.
The Supreme Court, in Maria Margadia Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria [AIR (2012) SC 1727], held that a property owner seeking to recover possession may file an appropriate civil suit—whether for recovery of possession, for ejectment of a former lessee, for a mandatory injunction directing a person to vacate, or even a suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act.
The Rajasthan High Court noted that, applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Maria Margadia Sequeria Fernandes (supra), the Madras High Court in Munusamy v. Duraibabu Mudailar, S.A. No. 133/2016 (decided on January 1, 2019), upheld a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendant to vacate and hand over possession of the house. In that case, the dispute was between two brothers; the elder brother had allowed the younger one to live in his home out of affection. When the younger brother later asserted ownership rights, a suit for mandatory injunction was filed and decreed, and the High Court affirmed that decree.
The Rajasthan High Court observed that it was appropriate to refer to and reproduce a relevant judgment of the Bombay High Court that directly addresses the issue at hand.
The referenced decision is Conrad Dias of Bombay v. Joseph Dias of Bombay [AIR 1995 BOM 210], where the facts closely resembled the present matter. In that case, a father filed a suit seeking a mandatory injunction requiring his son to vacate and leave the property. The Bombay High Court held that a person living in a parental home does not acquire any legal status—certainly not that of a “licensee” under Section 52 of the Easements Act—and resides merely as a family member, without any additional legal entitlement. The Court also addressed the maintainability of a suit for mandatory injunction instead of a suit for possession.
In light of this reasoning, the Rajasthan High Court concluded that the Trial Court was justified in granting a decree of mandatory injunction directing the defendant to vacate the property and return possession to the plaintiff.
Rajasthan High Court stated: “The objection raised by the Senior Counsel for the appellant (son) at the second-appeal stage is rejected. No other substantial question of law has been presented, nor does any arise in this appeal. In the Court’s view, the present second appeal lacks substance and is without merit.”
The Court further noted that this case is far from a routine dispute. The appellant, the biological son of the respondent (Mr. Khatri, father), is an educated individual fully aware that the property was purchased by his father in his own name, jointly with his brother, and that his own occupation of the premises is solely by virtue of being a family member living in his father’s house.
Rajasthan High Court observed
“Despite failing to establish his claim of being an owner or co-parcener—and despite both the Trial Court and First Appellate Court rejecting his assertion that the property formed part of a HUF—the appellant (son) still chose to pursue the matter up to the High Court. This conduct amounts to nothing more than subjecting his father to unnecessary harassment.”
The Court further stated that, to discourage such litigation—which damages the sanctity and trust inherent in a father–son relationship—it is appropriate to impose costs on the appellant (son).
Judgement: “Though imposition of cost may not be sufficient to compensate for the agony, distress, and harassment, faced by the father in contesting this litigation, yet it would set an example for future not to stretch such kind of litigation maliciously. The cost is quantified to the tune of Rs 1,00,000 (Rupees One Lakh), which shall include litigation expenses as well, and shall be payable to the respondent (Mr. Khatri, father). As a final result, the present second appeal is dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs 1,00,000 to be paid by the appellant (son) to the respondent. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.”