The Appeal before the Supreme Court challenged the Judgment of the Telangana High Court remanding the matter to the Family Court.
Noting the mother’s attempts to obstruct the father visitation rights and recognizing that the minor child could not decide what was best for him, the Supreme Court directed the father to visit his 11-year-old son every Sunday for two hours.
The appeal before the Supreme Court was filed by the appellant against the Telangana High Court’s Division Bench judgment, which had allowed the respondent’s appeal, setting aside the Principal Family Court’s order in the execution petition and remanding the case to the Family Court.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia and Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah ordered, “…in the present lis, the issue relates to the life of a minor child who has still not attained maturity himself and is not in a position to decide what is best for him. Thus, the responsibility for him is also on the Court which is seized of the matter. The Court has to be extremely careful in taking a considered view, such that the interests of the minor child are adequately safeguarded.”
Factual Background
The appellant-father and respondent-mother were married in 2012 according to Hindu rites and rituals, and they had a son in 2024. Disputes later arose between them, leading to their separation, during which the respondent-mother had physical custody of their minor son. They filed a petition under Sections 13B and 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the Family Court granted a mutual consent divorce. The respondent-mother was awarded permanent custody of the child, while the appellant-father received interim custody on weekends.
The appellant claimed that in 2021, the respondent cut off all contact between their son and him, despite his repeated efforts to stay in touch. This led the appellant to file an Execution Petition, seeking the appointment of an Advocate Commissioner to enforce the Divorce Decree. The Family Court granted the request and appointed an Advocate Commissioner for its execution. However, when the matter reached the High Court, the respondent’s appeal was upheld, and the case was sent back to the Family Court. Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.
Reasoning
After reviewing the case facts and submissions, the Bench observed that during multiple interactions with the courts, the minor son expressed reluctance to meet or visit his father. He stated that he did not wish to stay with him, citing a lack of sufficient time and attention from the appellant-father. “There is a lot to be said about the conduct of the Respondent mother who clearly attempts to prevent/obstruct/stop the visitation rights granted to the Appellant-father, that too pursuant to a consent decree between the parties”, The Bench emphasized that the matter concerned the life of a minor child who had not yet attained maturity and was unable to determine what was best for him.
The Bench also observed, “We were seriously contemplating to direct immediate compliance with the already existing decree before the Respondent’s petition for modification of the original decree was heard and decided. However, being conscious of the fact that we are also in the parens patriae jurisdiction, and even interim arrangements could have a negative effect on the tender and fragile frame of the mind of the minor son, we ultimately find that the matter needs fresh consideration. The Impugned Judgment is thus, not interdicted. However, we hasten to add that during the interregnum period, the father cannot be totally deprived of the company of the minor son.”
The Bench granted the father visitation rights every Sunday from 4 PM to 6 PM and directed that the child be accompanied by his caretaker to the appellant-father’s house. The caretaker was to remain on the premises but not in the immediate presence of the appellant-father, his family members, or the minor son.
The Bench disposed of the appeal by referring the case back to the Family Court, directing it to conclude the proceedings promptly, within a maximum of three months.