The Court said there must be references to specific words used, contextual details or any gestures that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty.
The Supreme Court recently held that Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which criminalizes acts that insult a woman’s modesty, cannot be invoked solely on the claim that “filthy language” was used. Instead, there must be a contextual framework or accompanying expressions indicating an intent to insult the woman’s modesty [Mashushree Datta vs State of Karnataka].
A Bench comprising Justices Dipankar Datta and Pankaj Kumar Mishra emphasized the need for specific references to the words used, contextual details, or gestures—whether preceding, following, or accompanying such words—that establish a criminal intent to insult the modesty.
“The term “filthy language,” when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant’s modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509 of the IPC,” the Court said.
The Supreme Court was addressing a case in which an employee claimed she was forcibly terminated from her job and that her employer confiscated her laptop containing intellectual property. She also alleged that security personnel escorted her out of the office premises.
The employee further accused two senior colleagues of using abusive language during her termination.
An FIR was registered against the accused under Sections 323 (voluntarily causing hurt), 504 (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace), 506 (criminal intimidation), and 509 (insulting the modesty of a woman) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
After the High Court declined to quash the FIR and chargesheet, the accused approached the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court set aside the charges under Section 509 of the IPC, reasoning that the actions of the appellants did not exhibit the necessary intent or awareness to reasonably infer that their conduct could provoke a severe emotional reaction amounting to an insult to a woman’s modesty.
The Court observed that the woman’s complaint did not suggest that the accused used language directed at her that would constitute an offence under Section 509 of the IPC.
While the chargesheet claims that the accused scolded the complainant using “filthy language,” this allegation was not mentioned in the FIR, the Court noted.
“The absence of any references to specific words used, contextual details, or accompanying gestures—whether preceding or succeeding the alleged words—the failure to mention the use of any “filthy language” in the complaint; and the fact that this allegation is only found in the chargesheet: there are serious concerns regarding the claim of insulting modesty of the complainant by the appellants. Considering the materials available on record, we are of the view that prima facie ingredients of an offence under Section 509 of the IPC have not been disclosed,” the Court ruled.
The Supreme Court clarified that a conviction under Section 323 of the IPC for causing hurt requires evidence of a voluntary act resulting in bodily pain, disease, or infirmity to another person. Thus, actual harm must be proven.
Regarding the offence of criminal intimidation, the Court stated that it must be demonstrated that the accused intended to cause alarm to the complainant for the charge to stand.
In the absence of these elements, the Court quashed both charges.
Regarding the offence under Section 504 of the IPC (intentional insult with intent to provoke a breach of peace), the Supreme Court held that it must be proven, based on the evidence, that the insult was intentional and carried out with the intent or knowledge that it would provoke a disturbance of public peace or lead to the commission of another offence.
The Court concluded that none of the essential elements of Sections 323, 504, 506, or 509 of the IPC were satisfied, even if the complainant’s allegations were assumed to be true in their entirety.