The Court faulted the police and the trial court for charging a man with voyeurism merely for filming a woman entering a disputed property.
The Supreme Court has ruled that taking photographs or recording videos of a woman without her consent while she is engaged in non-private acts does not constitute voyeurism under Section 354C of the Indian Penal Code [Tuhin Kumar Biswas vs. State of West Bengal].
A bench of Justices NK Singh and Manmohan quashed the case against a man who had been charged with voyeurism only for filming a woman as she entered a disputed property.
In its ruling, the bench observed that the police and the trial court should have exercised greater caution while filing the chargesheet and framing charges of voyeurism, especially when there was no strong basis to support the allegation.
The Court further remarked that proceeding with cases without meeting the threshold of strong suspicion only burdens the criminal justice system and diverts resources away from matters of greater seriousness.
The case before the Court arose from a long-standing dispute between two brothers over a residential property in Salt Lake, Kolkata. The accused, Tuhin Kumar Biswas, is the son of one of the co-owners, and the FIR was linked to an incident connected with this property dispute.
The dispute began in 2018, when the accused’s father filed a civil suit against his brother. On November 29, 2018, the civil court ordered both parties to maintain joint possession of the property and refrain from creating third-party rights. This injunction was still valid when the complainant, Mamta Agarwal, visited the property in March 2020.
Subsequently, she lodged an FIR—allegedly at the instance of the accused’s uncle—claiming that Biswas had wrongfully restrained and intimidated her and had taken her photos and videos without her consent.
On August 16, 2020, the police filed a chargesheet for offences under Sections 341 (wrongful restraint), 354C (voyeurism) and 506 (criminal intimidation) of the IPC, despite the complainant declining to record a judicial statement.
When both the trial court and the Calcutta High Court rejected his request for discharge, the accused moved the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court first discussed the legal principle governing discharge, emphasizing that a case should proceed to trial only if the prosecution’s material creates a strong suspicion that the accused may have committed the offence. At this stage, the Court noted, the judiciary acts as a filter to prevent weak or unfounded cases from going to trial.
The Bench then considered whether the FIR and chargesheet made out an offence of voyeurism. It clarified that voyeurism applies only when a woman is observed or photographed during a private act—such as undressing, using the bathroom, or engaging in a sexual act. In the present case, the Court found no allegation indicating that the complainant was involved in any such private act.
The Court pointed out that although the High Court had already accepted that the FIR did not disclose the offence of voyeurism, it nevertheless refused to discharge the appellant — a conclusion the Supreme Court held to be unsustainable.
With respect to the charge of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC, the Court observed that the FIR did not mention any threat to the complainant’s person, property, or reputation — a necessary ingredient of the offence.
The allegation of wrongful restraint was also scrutinised. The Court noted that there was no material to show that the complainant was a tenant; the record indicated only that she had visited the property as a prospective tenant to “see” the premises.
The Court noted that bringing in a tenant would have violated the civil court’s injunction. Therefore, it held that the accused acted under a bona fide belief that he was entitled to prevent entry into the property in view of the subsisting injunction order.
Against this backdrop, the Court concluded that the FIR arose entirely from the family’s ongoing civil dispute over the property. Even if the allegations were accepted as true, the Court observed, they pointed only to matters that should be resolved through civil remedies—such as injunctions or applications in the pending suit—rather than through criminal proceedings.
The Bench went on to criticise the tendency of filing chargesheets even in cases where no strong suspicion is made out, observing that this practice places an unnecessary burden on the criminal justice system.
“The tendency of filing chargesheets in matters where no strong suspicion is made out clogs the judicial system. It forces Judges, court staff, and prosecutors to spend time on trials that are likely to result in an acquittal. This diverts limited judicial resources from handling stronger, more serious cases, contributing to massive case backlogs. Undoubtedly, there can be no analysis at the charge framing stage as to whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal, but the fundamental principle is that the State should not prosecute citizens without a reasonable prospect of conviction, as it compromises the right to a fair process,” the Court said.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and cleared the appellant of all charges.